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OUTWI?TING THE HISTORICAL DYNAMIC: MIMESIS AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF ANTISEMITISM IN Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Dialectic of Enlightenment first appeared in 1944 in a limited mimeographed edition 
presented to Friedrich Pollock, the Institute for Social Research's economist, in honor of his 
50th birthday. For that occasion the simple title Philomhische Fragmente -- with its oblique 
allusion to Kierkegaard - sufficed. When an altered and expanded version of the text was 
published four years later by Querido Verlag, the German exile publishing house in 
Amsterdam, title became subtitle and the title of the lead essay "Dialectic of Enlightenment" 
became its permanent title. Stylistic improvement notwithstanding, the intense discussion of 
the authorship, composition, and place of Dialectic of Enli~htenment in the ouevre of its co- 
authors that has unfolded over the past few years makes the rationale for the original title 
worth keeping in mind. This oddly structured book, with its two main essays, two 
"excursus", "theses" on anti-Semitism, and aphoristic "notes and drafts" attests to its erratic 
mode of composition over several years, and its mosaic of distinct genres of writing. The 
presumption that a unified "critical theory" auld  be embodied in this text, or in the work of 
the "Fmkfwt School" as a whole, has long since become a dubious proposition.' 
The publication of Rolf Wiggershaus' Die Frankfurter Schule and the Max 
Horkheimer Gesammelte Schriften, which includes correspondence, drafts, minutes of 
discussions, and internal .institute debates that surrounded the composition of Dialectic of 
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worth keeping in mind. This oddly structured book, with its two main essays, two 
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Enli~htenment, have contributed a great deal to our understanding of the circumstances under 
which it emerged during the years between 1938 and 1944.2 We can see the justification, as 
well as the exaggeration, of Horkheimer's assertion in the preface to the 1968 edition: "No 
outsider will find it easy to discern how far we are both responsible for every sentence. We 
jointly dictated lengthy sections; and the .vital principle of the Dialectic is the tension between 
the two intellectual temperaments conjoined in it." This sentence, for all its ambiguity, 
stresses not merely the collaborative composition of the work, but the tensions out of which 
-it was constructed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr's caveat, in his otherwise indispensable essay on 
the "Place of Dialectic of Enlightenment in the Development of Critical Theory, " that "it is 
nonetheless to be doubted that .both-theories represent, in the sense of this declaration, an 
'unbroken unity" is somewhat misplaced, since no such unity was implied." 
Work on a proposed book began in earnest in late 1941, after Adorno's decision, 
taken after much prodding by Horkheimer (who provided detailed descriptions of the local 
real estate) to leave New York and join him in Santa Monica. Much of the book was written 
before and during the early days of American involvement in World War II, when its 
outcome was still uncertain, and only the "Elements of Anti-Semitismn were drafted during 
the last two years of the war. Its last "thesisn - added in 1947 - alone registers the authors' 
realization that Hitler's barbarism had exceeded even the most melancholy prognoses of 20th 
century philosophy's most melancholic thinkers. 
Dialectic of Enlightenment - was a collaborative work undertaken with no strict division 
of labor, nor any superordinate effort to conceal its authors' distinctive sensibilities and 
voices. This makes any defhitive mapping of their respective roles difficult if not 
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impossible, though the extant manuscripts establish the main lines of responsibility for the 
book's distinct sections. According to Schmid Noerr, drafts found in either Horkheimer's or 
Adorno's papers make it reasonably certain that the Introduction, "The Concept of 
Enlightenment," "Excursus IL" or "Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality" were largely 
drafted by Horkheimer, while the Excursus I on "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment," and 
chapter on "The Culture Industry" were Adorno's responsibility. ' The "Notes and Drafts" 
are exclusively Horkheimer's while the "Elements of Anti-Semitism" can be attributed to 
Adorno, with the collaboration of Leo Liiwenthal, though thesis "VII" which was written 
solely for the 1947 edition, was principally ~orkheimer's.~ 
Despite the reliability of this archival evidence, there is still considerable controversy 
over the authorship of the first chapter. Robert Hullot-Kentor, for example, "casts doubt on 
Horkheimer's primacy in its composition. With few edceptions, there are no comparable 
lines in the rest of Horkheimer's work' neither before nor after did he formulate such 
compelling  idea^."^ Though obviously partisan to Adorno, his assertion is not entirely 
inconsistent with Rolf Tiedemann's account, attributed to Adorno himself, that both authors 
dictated "The Concept of Enlightenment."' Oral testimony and stylistic clues must, as 
Schmid Noerr acknowledges, also be taken into account and joint authorship is further 
attested to by the fact that the recorded discussions between Horkheimer and Adomo in early 
1939 bear most heavily on this chapter.' At the time, Horkheimer described his work-habits 
to Paul Tillich as follows: "in the morning a short walk with Pollock, then directly after, 
based on rather methodical study, I write notes and drafts, and in the afternoon I see (at 
least) Teddie, in order to finalize the finished text."9 
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Chapter. I contains many formulations, particularly its detours into intellectual 
history,, that could only stem from Horkheimer, and others &e similar to those in his essay 
"The End of Reason" published in 1941 (which also emerged from the period of close 
collaboration with Adomo). For example, sentences such as "the increasingly formalistic 
universality of reason, far from signifying an increasing consciousness of universal solidarity 
expresses the skeptical separation of thought from' its object," are typical of Horkheimer 
during this period.'' However, -Horkheimer's sole authorship of the first chapter can 
be disputed on the grounds that its main theme of the self-destruction of reason through the 
domination of nature and the sacrifice of the ego was already substantially developed by 
Adoma more than a decade earlier in his Habilitation on Kierkegaard, and was reiterated in 
the draft of Zur Philosobhie der moderne Musik, also written in 1941. The first chapter fuses 
that motif with Horkheimer's more general argument, characteristic of his early philosophical 
essays and set forth in the Eclipse of Reason (1946), that universally valid norms and the 
idea of a good society, once embodied in the tradition of "objective Reason" (Plato, 
Aristotle, German Idealism) had given way to the calculating, self-preserving "subjective 
reason" of modern.bourgeois society. However, in the published version, the categories of 
objective and subjective reason no longer appear, and the reconstruction of rationality as the 
"myth of omnipotence" is grounded notin the history of philosophy but in philosophical 
anthropology. 
Even more difiicult to disentangle than authorship, is the question of how to weigh 
the respective authors' contribution to the text's central philosophical themes. Jiirgen 
Habermas has elaborated a critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment which, briefly stated, 
charges that the work "owes more to Nietzsche then just the strategy of an ideology critique 
turned against itself."" According to Habermas, "Nietzsche gives the critique of reason 
such an afhmtive twist that even determinate negation - which is to say, the very 
procedure that Horkheimer and Adorno want to retain as the sole exercise, since reason itself 
has become so shaky -- loses its sting. Nietzsche's critique consumes the critical impulse 
Dialectic of Enli~htenment subordinates critique to aesthetics, critical reflection 
and judgement to taste: "Nietzsche suppressed the paradoxical structure and explained the 
complete assimilation of reason to power in modernity with a theorv of Dower that was 
remythologized out of arbitrary pieces and that, in place of the claim to truth, retains no 
more than the rhetorical claim proper to an aesthetic This fateful turn in 
critical theory is understandable only against the background of "the darkest years of the 
Second World Warn when it appeared to the authors "that the last sparks of reason were 
being extinguished fr& reality and had left the ruins of a civilization in collapse without any 
hope. " l4 
Though Habermas does not substantially distinguish the two authors in m e  
Philoso~hical Discourse of Modernity, elsewhere he clearly makes Adorno culpable for its 
fall into Nietzscheanism: "On the one hand, Dialectic of Enli~htenment - marks a break with 
the program pursued in the Zeitschrift fiir Sozialforschung; on the other, it fits seamlessly 
into the continuity of a way of thinking later characterized as negative dialectics. "I5 
Habermas also asserts that the more generous position that "Enlightenment must reflect on 
itself if humanity is not to be totally betrayedW@Ed5) is found only in those chapters in 
which Horkheimer's hand is visible. " l6 Horkheimer's pessimism, Habermas believes, 
brought him closer to Benjamin's "theological" critique of progress and into a "temporary 
rapprochement" with Adorno. Horkheimer then issued assurances "covering up the 
differences that had always existed between their positions."" Even the fragmentary 
character of the work bears traces of Adomo's conviction that philosophy had to follow 
Nietzsche's path: "It was not even Horkheimer's original intention that Dialectic of 
Enli~htenment remain a collection of fragments. He had pIanned a systematic work and had 
previously made use of conventional forms of presentation. By contrast, Adorno was 
convinced from early on that fragmentary representation was the only suitable form for 
philosophical thought."'* It should at least be pointed out here that Horkheimer's own 
ambivalences regarding Nietzsche are more complex, a point that can be made by simply 
referring to Horkheimer's earlier collections of aphorisms, which even bore the Nietzschean 
title Dimmerung (Daybreak). Habermas holds Adorno entirely responsible for the excesses 
of a book that is something of an embarrassment for Horkheimer, who "holds fast with a 
defiance born of despair, and sometimes even an abrupt naivete, to the liberal heritage of 
the era of Enlightenment. "I9 Adorno's influence drew Horkheimer towards the radical 
critique of reason, while Habermas dissociates Horkheimer from the taint of Nietzscheanism 
by pointing to his discomfort with the text's preface: "If enlightenment is caught up in an 
irresistible process of selfdestruction, then on what does the critique that determines this 
base its right to such a diagnosis? Since Nietzsche, the answer has always been the same: 
the radical critique of reason proceeds self-referentially; critique cannot simultaneously be 
radical and leave its own criteria untouched." Horkheimer, Habermas claims, "is troubled by 
this *ria" and he "shies away from the conclusion that the very act of enlightened 
knowledge is affected by the process of self destruction. "20 Horkheimer "would rather 
entangle himself in contradictions than give up his identity as an enlightener and fall into 
Nietzscheanism. "*' 
Habermas's .version of the emergence of Dialectic of Enlightenment is echoed by 
Richard Wolin when he writes that though it was "allegedly jointly dictated by Horkheimer 
and Adorno, the work's basic theoretical inclinations seem to be overwhelmingly indebted to 
Adorno's influences and proclivities. In fact, its fundamental argument tended to contradict 
-not only the Institute's previous positions on Western philosophy, metaphysics, and so forth, 
but also its philosophy of history, which had been, in the Marxist .tradition, basically 
pr~gressivist."~ This view makes Horkheimer and Adorno's close collaboration in the late 
1930s and early 1940s something of a pactum diaboli, and its most important result, Dialectic 
of .Enlightenment, if not anathema, certainly an anomaly in the history of critical theory. 
11. 
A rereading of the text of Dialectic of Enli~htenment, as well as the supporting 
documentation and correspondence in the Max Horkheimer-Archiv suggests that this account 
serves more establish Habermas's role as the legitimate heir of the original Frankfurt School 
than to illuminate the conditions under which it emerged. A rather different, perhaps even 
opposing interpretation in which Horkheimer's often undialectical pessemism is consistently 
' 
challenged by Adorno's more acutely "desperate hope" is more plausible.t3 No doubt in the 
1940s both authors shared a sense of civihtional breakdown - hardly illegitimate in light of 
the events of that era. But even their specific prognoses, for example, differences over the 
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probable outcome of the war, shows that Adorno registers far more optimism than does 
Horkheimer, whose attachment to his youthful idol Schopenhauer, came increasingly to the 
fore. For example, in a May 1945 letter to Horkheimer, lamenting the fact that they could 
not be together at the moment that the Hitler regime collapsed, Adorno could not resist 
commenting that his "bourgeois thesis, that Hitler could not hold on, had ironically if 
belatedly, been 
Adorno never "slipped into irrationalism" as Habermas' antipodal interpretation 
implies, while Horkheimer's prognoses and philosophical reflections frequently take on the 
contours of a truly apocalyptic pessemism. As Hullot-Kentor rightly points out, there is no 
evidence that the passages arguing for the weak power of reason are, as Habermas claims, 
. "from Horkheimer's hand," and many other passages from Adorno's work attest to the fact 
that "he is pursuing a critique of reason by way of Wiggershaus too cites 
examples from Adomo's draft of Zur Philoso~hie der neuen Musik (published 1949), written 
shortly after his arrival in Mornia ,  which directly parallel the assertions of the paradoxical 
character of enlightenment in the development of modem music: "conscious control over 
natural musical material is both the emancipation of humanity from the musical compulsion 
of nature, and the subordination of nature to human aims. 
Habermas's i n e o n  manifestly ignores, as Alfred Schmidt notes, "the fact that 
Horkheimer appropriates historical materialism from a Schopenhauerian point of view from 
the very beginning."t7 It is not so that Adorno's influence seduced Horkheimer away from 
his earlier preoccupation with the recouping of an "eclipsed" tradition of Enlightenment 
thought. Horkheimer regarded the rejection of all rationalistic stystems and the "move from 
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Kant to Schopenhauer" as "an advance in the self-enlightenment of reason, not a relapse into 
irrationality," a view that underscores the many references to Schopenhauer throughout his 
early work, particularly in his belief that the blind contingency of history and the suffering of 
individuals could not be redeemed by an abstract, objective ~eason.~' The thesis of a 
clearcut division between the rationalist Horkheirner and the irrationalist Adorno does not do 
justice to the "tensionsn between the authors alluded to by Horkheimer in his preface, and in 
many respects blocks an understanding of the distinctions between.them privately 
acknowledged elsewhere by the authors themselves. 
Moreover, even an adequate summary of their distinct philosophical positions would 
not exhaust the ambivalences, tensions and dissonances that often plagued not only the 
composition of this work, but the individual authors. For example, in a letter to Adorno, 
written just before the latter's arrival in California and the beginning of the period of 
collaboration on Dialectic of Enli~htenment, Horkheimer remarked: "That I myself feel, 
comically enough, that we are being pressed against our will into a front with rationalism, 
which no longer exists, and as the main content of my essay I am thinking about the 
delimitation from rationalism. But I confess that at the moment, I do this with difficulty.'@ 
To be sure, both before and after. writing Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer placed 
greater emphasis than Adorno on "rescuing the,enlightenmentn (a title he proposed for the 
never written sequel to Dialectic of Enli~htenment), but it was, as I will argue, 
Horkheimer's, and not Adorno's pessemism, that precluded further collaboration on the 
planned volume in the post World War I1 era. Thus, we can conclude that it is more in 
reaction to the perceived threat of an "inationalist" postmodernism that Adorno's reputation 
has so readily been sacrificed to restore the rationalist roots of critical theory.30 
In the Fall of 1931 a series of internal discussions were held at the Institut fiir 
Sozialforschung in Frankfurt on the general theme of the "crisis of science." Their point of 
departure was Horkheimer's recently published article "The Present Situation of Social 
Philosophy" which had appeared earlier that year. Horkheimer maintained that a 
reconstruction of social philosophy was no longer possible and that the interdisciplinary 
research program which he had proposed for the Institute - guided by theoretical reflection 
on "the essentialn- was the only reasonable way to confront the impasse: "The current 
situation of social philosophy can be understood in principle in terms of its dissolution, and 
of the impossibility of reconstructing it in thought without falling behind the current state of 
knowledge. "" Horkheimer defended his conclusions against Adorno's criticism that his 
conception of an interdkciplinary social theory was "too primitively formulated" and that it 
conceded far too much to analytical empirical research. Adorno's difficulties with what he 
called Horkheimer's "two world theory" in which subjective reason was confronted with the 
impossibility of objective theoretical reflection could, he noted, be avoided only by "the 
singular moment of non-identity," in which dialectical thought gives itself over to the object 
as "merely con- phen~menality.~ It was, Adorno said, preferable to completely abjure 
any "total dialectic" than risk, as did Horkheirner, becoming both "a theoretical positivist and 
a practical materialist. n33 
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When the Institute moved to New York in 1936 these discussions resumed, and, by 
1939, already began to touch on some of the central themes of Dialectic of Enli~htenment. 
At that time, Horkheimer's still retained the hope that historical materialism could bring 
sensual, empirical reality into the domain of theory without abandoning either the 
achievements of the scientific understanding of the world, or the historicity of Hegel's 
critique of Kant. Horkheimer and Adorno's exchanges at that juncture capture some of the 
essential differences between their conceptions of philosophy in the late 1930s: 
Horkheimer: "For me it is a matter of more strongly highlighting the positive 
importance of the moment of the factual for dialectical theory. Even we have to work 
with substantial relations (Sachvehlte), which can be controlled, or else we have no 
criterium any longer to distinguish sense from nonsense." 
Adorno: "One must be very subtle here. We must determine the distinctions between 
the positivist concept of facts and our concept of substantial relations."' 
- .  Here Adorno alludes to his long essay on Husserl, which was concerned with 
establishing the nature of "Sachverhalte" or substantial relations without falling, as he 
believed Husserl had, into assuming the existence of Transcendental ego. Only the historicity 
of experience could escape the idealist moment lurking in any positivist epistemology. 
"Fact.," Adorno claimed, "are always that which as caDut mortuum [dead physical existence) 
is left over from the historical process. The substantial things of which we speak are 
actually never a first, but always a last: the are the Residua, that which remains indissoluble 
against a fully developed state of theoryn3' These conversations often go the core of the 
distinct understandings of "theory" that coexisted in critical theory at that time. Whereas 
Horkheimer still conceived of theory in conventional Hegelian terms "as the tension between 
you yourself and reality," or as "a means to come to terms with the world" Adorno reacted 
caustically:" "Theory is, god knows, not the holy Spirit. Nor can Theory be reduced to 
spontaneity or to thought, it has the facts within i t~e l f . "~  
Horkheimer's attempt to reconcile Hegel with contemporary scientific developments 
appeared to Adorno as a fixation on the concept of totality, and he questioned whether the 
very definition of facticity proposed by Horkheimer didn't presuppose an organizing totality 
-in the Hegelian sense. "The whole difference with Hegel lies one stratum deeper than the 
distinction between totality and non-finality, namely if everything, which falls into the circle 
of thought, appears only as thought or if it can be really seen as something which does not 
fall into it, but which can still only be understood'in relation to thought." Recalling 
Benjamin's prologue to the "Baroque book" (The Origin of the German Plav of Mourning), 
Adorno admitted that "the kind of gaze that I have,' is such that it finds in things the 
refraction Widerschein) of that light source, which can never be the object of intention and 
tho~ght."~ Such starkly theological motifs remained incomprehensible to Horkheimer who 
suggested that Adorno might have an "omniscient wink of the eye." That Adorno took the 
joke seriously is not untypical: "All that remains of theology is the wink of the eye."'* 
Adorno affirmed not a 'nihilistic collapse of reason, but the credo he had expressed in his 
Kierkegaard study in 1933: "The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover 
something that thought cannot think."3g Unlike Horkheimer, Adorno remained skeptical of 
any statement in which truth is positively expressed: "I cannot conceal my opinion that a 
formulation of the concept of truth without a particular conception of negative theology is 
impossible. "" 
The gap between Horkheimer's skepticism concerning a theory that no is no longer 
capable of containing the world as facts (positivism) and the world as moral imperative (the 
ideal), and Adorno's phenomenological philosophy of immanence, was not, however, in 
those years, entirely unbridgeable. They acknowledged, often with brutal fhnkness, their 
differences in style and depth. Horkheimer's prose, Adorno once tells "is below the 
experience which you would like to communicate, while mine, is far above that, which I can 
communi~ate."~~ AS Adomo put it, "I believe, that our conceptions are much more 
similar here than it may at first appear. I always say, that theory does very little, almost 
P- 2 . -  
4. nothing, it solves only the questions, that are brought to it from materiality." Adorno also 
,. . - . .. reassured Horkheimer that despite their differences, they still shared a "hope for utopia." 
Adorno the metaphysician who distrusted metaphysics,'and Horkheimer, the materialist who 
- .  
distrusted positivism, had, Adorno observed, arrived at a similar point from two different 
,.. per~peitives~~: "The fact that I was influenced by certain metaphysical thoughts, and that 
you liquidated the entire positivistic heritage of Marxism is not accidental. It comes from a 
certain feeling of impoverishment in that kind of howledge, where there is cognizance of 
the of traces." This, he said, contained "my core philosophical experience, and your critical 
motor. "" 
If these conversations demonstrate their different styles and "sensibilities" they also . 
point.to broad areas of consensus. Adorno did not entirely reject Horkheimer's insistence 
pm facticity, nor his implication that theory was linked to experience, remarking that he too . 
had to "follow the facts." While Horkheimer's mistrust of any closed theory presupposed the 
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identity of "each insight" and the whole of the theory, Adorno asserted, "I instead require the 
thicket of experien~e."~~ 
In June 1941 Hannah Arendt provided Adomo with a copy of Benjamin's last text, 
the now famous "theses on the philosophy of history." Though Benjamin had instructed that 
it not be published, and though there was, as Adomo put it, "a certain naivete in the 
passages that speak of Marxism and politics cannot be overlooked," in light of Benjamin's 
suicide he urged Horkheimer to publish the theses as a kind of testament. More importantly 
he emphasized that "no other work of Benjamin shows him to be closer to our intentions. " 
Its major themes: history as a permanent catastrophe, the critique of progress, the domination 
of nature, and the attitude toward culture were indicative of his - and their - intellectual 
preoccupations. But, Adorno also added a postscript with his reservations. In particular, he 
noted, thesis XIII with its notion of "progression through a homogenous empty time" 
troubled him, since it appeared to reduce the "conformist conception of history" to the 
"appeamnce of time" as some€hing "sui ~eneris." And finally Adomo questioned whether 
Benjamin's explicitly messianic emphasis on "the presence of the now" would "entirely 
liquidate the image of the future from utopia," adding parenthetically and underlining in 
handwriting, "by the way, we would have difficulty speaking of the 'whore' &."45 
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The arrival of Benjamin's philosophical testament provided. for Horkheimer and 
Adorno, as Wiggershaus notes, a kind of "guiding star" around which the constellation of 
themes - the fate of the exile, the fate of the Jews, and catastrophe of civilization - that 
ultimately make up Dialectic of Enlightenment could be organized. In a work of exile that 
makes Homer's ancient exile its "hero," the nanative of Odysseus provides a kind of 
allegory of the theory elaborated in the first chapter. Odysseus embodies the "homesickness" 
that is the origin of the adventure through which subjectivity is first constituted in the epic 
m t i v e ,  and who "by his cunning and reason escapes prehistory."(O/l39.) As Odysseus 
resists regression into the world of magic and matriarchy, the modern epic of the 
homelessness, exile, and diaspora of reason is counterpoised to the fascist glorification of 
rootedness and the mythology of Heimat. In the Odysseus chapter any "phantasm of a lost 
golden age" is explicitly rejected. Rather, heimat "is the state of having e~caped.""~(O/139) 
To Nietzsche's adage, "It is even part of my good fortune not to be a house-owner," 
Adorno commented, "Today, we should have to add: it is part of morality not to be at home 
in one's home."" Yet, the price of this "escape" is identity, the irnitatio of the power of 
the gods in the power of the individual ratio. The reason that outwits myth becomes 
mythological. Rational thought, the intellect, binds itself to its object to the degree that it 
attempts toundo its power over thought. Reason sacrifices itself to myth, in its effort to 
outwit myth by replicating nature. By its very dependency on the object, it is robbed of its 
autonomy and freedom, so that "all sacdice in the domain of consciousness assumes the 
form of the paradoxical. "(Kt 1 19) 
F D ~  Horkheimer and Adorno, enlightenment does not consist of drawing boundaries 
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against myth, but in acknowledging both the mythical character of rationality and the rational 
c-ter of myth: "Just as the myths realize enlightenment, so enlightenment with every step 
becomes more entwined in mythology."@E, 16) Enlightenment no longer demands the 
derogation of myth that the eighteenth century savants indulged with generous wit and 
scathing criticism, but an appreciation of the price of progrey as "he mythical sacrifice of 
~ e a s o n . " ~ ~  Exile brings with it speech, discourse, and remembrance of disaster. 
Enlightenment, in this sense is equated with the "cold distance of nar1ation"(O/l40). 
The first chapter of Dialectic of Enli~htenment is a genealogy of the mimetic origins 
of consciousness: first @ the order of animistic identification, then in magic, subsequently in 
myth and finally in Reason: "The categories by which Western philosophy defined its 
everlasting natural order marked the spots once occupied by Oncus and Persephone, Ariadne 
and Nereus."@E/S) At all stages the concept of mimesis, understood not as imitation, but 
as a form of mimicry that appqriates rather than replicate its object in a non-identical 
similitude, plays a central role in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Mimesis is not the repression 
of difference but an act of substitution that intervenes between the helpless subject and the 
overpowering object: it appears in the terror with which all living creatures react to fear, in 
the magician's impersonation of demons, in his gestures of appeasement to the gods, or in 
the wearing of masks which guarantee that the identity of self "cannot disappear through 
identification with an~ther"@E/lO)?~ From the earliest stages of human culture, language 
is bound up with mimetic sacrifice, which involves the ritual substitution of an animal that is 
both representative and surrogate, the "non-specificity of the example," already marks a step 
toward discursive logic. "@E/10) Mimesis therefore represents both the prefiguration and 
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the "other" of reason: in Dialectic of Enlightenment the modem principle of calculability 
and equivalence is already prefigured by a growing abstraction and distance from nature that 
occurs first in the "specific" duplication of anthropomorphism, in the "non-specific" 
sacrifice, and ultimately in the unification of myth as the sovereignty of the human subject 
over nature. 
Yet, as "second nature," mimesis is completely assimilated to its object, repressed by 
the act of subjugating nature to. instrumental reason. "The &, which represses mimesis, is 
not simply its opposite. It too is mimesis: mimesis of death." The domination of nature is 
' adaptation, renunciation, calculation. It "renders unto nature what is nature's and precisely 
thereby deceives itW(0/122). Mimesis only retains its former status "weakly" in works of art 
which self~~nsciously refuse to "imitate" or "authentically" replicate reality, which refuse, - 
as Martin Jay notes, "to imitate or be ashikited entirely to a bad external reality - by 
paradoxically honoring, one might say, the Jewish taboo on graven images - works of art 
hold out the hope for the return of a more benign version of mimesis in a future world 
beyond domination and reification. "" 
Rationality is thus both equated with and marked off from other historical forms of 
mimesis, as mimesis' realization, overcoming, and prohibition. Reason "asserted the power 
of repetition over reality, long after men had renounced the illusion that by repetition they 
could identify themselves with the repeated reality and thus escape its powerW@El12). The 
prohibition on the graven image extends far beyond the representation of nature in animism 
or sacrificial substitution: "Just as hieroglyphs bear witness, so the word too originally had a 
pictorial function. "@E/17) However, in enlightenment, the word as sign abandons the claim 
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to be like nature and is distributed among the different art forms, further separating mimesis 
or "imitation" from substitution as the abstract equivalence of the concept: "as a system of 
signs, language is required to resign itself to calculation in order to know nature and must 
discard the claim to be like itN(DE/18). Not merely irnitatio but self conscious inauthenticity 
is the all-important element in mimesis: In the substitution that occurs in every ritual 
sacrif'ice, the "stupidity of the ritual" serves "the cleverness of the weaker." 
The taboo on pictoriality in the modem world is explicitly identified with Jewish 
Monotheism, which proscribed imitation by converting ritual into law. The Jews crossed the 
threshold from mythology to symbolism not by eliminating adaptation to nature, but by 
converting it into a series of duries in the form of ritual: The Jews "transformed taboos into 
civilizing maxims when others still clung to magicN@E, 186). Over thousands of years the 
Jews carried forward the process of enlightenment by enacting and transforming the taboo on 
images: "The Jews seemed to have succeeded where Christianity failed: they defused magic 
by its own power - turned aainst itslef as ritual semice of God. They have retained the 
aspect of expiation but have avoided the reversion to mythology which symbolism 
impliesN@E, 186). However, even in the "disenchanted world of Judaism, " Horkheimer and 
Adorno write, mimesis is still expressed in the "bond between name and being" that is 
recognized in "the ban on pronouncing the name of God. "@E/23) 
In the Odysseus chapter the premythical magical world is identified as matriarchal, 
populated by "ancient heroines" and by Odysseus' own mother. Mythic mimesis, is as, 
Andrew Hewitt has argued, is alreadly a step beyond these images, a step towards the 
symbolic, to the point where "mimesis feeds into rationality."" To fall back into the 
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premythic world of archaic images, he suggests, is to fall back into the "nondifferentiation of 
nature" and any preemptive attempt to reactivate archaism, as in fascism breaks through the 
prohibition by a return to a world of inauthenticity and terror masking as authenticity, 
heroism, and "being-in-the The "language of images" of mass cultural 
hieroglyphics are equally regarded as a "medium of re@onU which "displays the archaic 
images of modernity. "53 
For Adorno and Horkheimer there is no "outside" of enlightenment once image and 
howledge are completely severed, and no "authentic experience" can artificially restore the 
lost unity. True mimesis in the realm of art does' not claim authenticity, but as Miriam 
Hansen shows, "assumes a critical and corrective function vis-24s instrumental rationality 
and the identifying logic of conceptual language which distances subject from object and 
represses the non-identity of the latter."54 Adorno's Concept of mimesis is close to 
Benjamin's insofar as it is both the remembrance of a "nonsensuous similarity," between 
image and thing, and at the same time, an attempt to conceptually recapture the survival of 
mimesis in language, substituting for the identity of word and thing "a gap between the 
words and the things they conjure."s5 Art can never substitute for. concepts, nor can a 
world of images be restored. If enlightenment is a "universal taboo" on images, dialectic 
counters the taboo by interpreting every "image as writing," disclosing its false claims to 
authenticity. The "sacrificee required of consciousness is understood by Horkheimer and 
Adorno in Hegel's sense, not as positivistic reason, but as the negation of false mythology. 
In art, which contains the utopian remembrarice of the world before the prohibition 
and the illusion of its overcoming, "the capacity of representation is the vehicle of progress 
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and regression at one and the same time. "(DEI35) In Minima Moralia Adorno chides 
Nietzsche, whom he says was wrong to have reproached Wagner with play-acting since "all 
art, and music first of all is related to drama," and more importantly, because his reproach 
betrays his own inability to penetrate the fetishism of authenticity. Adorno's criticism of 
Nietzsche is further elaborated in the remark that despite his radical approach to truth, "the 
word genuine stands unquestioned exempt from conceptual developmentnM 
Mimesis for Adorno stands in the same relation to authenticity, as theology stands in 
relation to ontology. Ontology refers here to the claim to totally encompass being by its 
concept, which is the essence of any claim to authenticity: "Indeed, not only inauthetncticity 
that poses as veridical ought. to be convicted of lying: authenticity itself becomes a lie the 
moment it becomes authentic, that is in reflecting on itself, in postulating itself as genuine, in 
which it already oversteps the identity that it lays claim to in the same breadthmn For the 
founding thinken of existentialism, Kierkegaard, for example, the doctrine of inwardness, 
and "the priority of the self is as untrue as that of all who feel at home where they live." 
If, as Adomo asserts, all that is human is "indissolubly linked t o  imitation," any claim to 
genuineness is ultimately disingenuous. Theology, on the other hand, adopts the "likeness" 
of self to God, but never assumes its identity. As opposed to the idea of genuineness and 
authenticity, Adomo, maintains, the "self should not be spoken of as the ontological ground, 
but at most theologically, in the name of its likeness to God."Ss 
VI. 
By its repression of mimesis - which is the prohibition on the name and likeness of 
God - the self-sacrifice of enlightenment, as Adorno had written earlier, "is carried out with 
its own categories, rationally. "59 Through the element of deception, sacrifice is transformed 
into subjectivity; the phrase "subjectivity is truth" is therefore entirely paradoxical. It 
"reveals the horrible lineaments of the sacrificial mask. In the demonic sacrifice of 
consciousness, man is still the rule of a sinful creation; through m c e  he asserts his rule, 
and the name of the divinity succumbs to his demonic nature. "60 
During their initial conversations about myth and enlightenment during the Winter of 
1939, the idea for an "Urgeschichte" or primal history of subjectivity first makes an 
appearance in Horkheimer's question: "Where does the experience of the individual appear 
decisively for the first time?" Significantly, it is Oedipus and not, as is later the case, 
Odysseus who immediately comes to mind as the figure who embodies the identity of 
seIfhood with property and power. A passage retained only in altered form in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment offers this account: "Oedipus's answer to the riddle of the mythical sphinx, 
which he makes disappear, constitutes the Identity of the human being against the disparity of 
his stage of life. In the same moment as the word "the human being" drives the sphinx into 
the abyss, both the vagabond wife and the imperium fall into his possession"61 The real 
crime of Oedipus is perhaps "nothing less than the fact that he became an individual and 
possessed something." Here they drew a tentative connection between- the incest taboo and 
the dissolution .of the communal property. The site of the tragedy is the boundary line 
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between "myth and maturity" (Adomo) or what. Horkheimer calls "the announcement of the 
power of humanity through thought: The beginning of 'h~manisrn'."~~ Not surprisingly, it 
is also in the course of this discussion of the mythical itage of history, that a direct parallel 
is drawn between "regression to the collective body" (Adorno) and the fascist concept of the 
"mass. 
Horkheimer and Adomo's decision to shin the focus from Oedipus to Odysseus, can 
therefore only be partially explained as a shift from psychoanalytic theory to philosophical 
'anthropology. Oedipus emerges in the published text, not as a thinker who solves the riddle 
of the sphinx, but who, by dint of a trick, "evades" it. The element of deception, which 
occurs in the very act of substituting the "mask" for the name or image, is even more central 
to the story of Odysseus, and thus to the central theme of the prohibition on mimesis that - 
emerges in the first chapter. 
Freud, as the authors were aware, also invested Oedipus' fate with the originary tale 
of maturity against myth, individual against multiplicity, identical subject against the chthonic 
forces of nature that conspire to tear the ego asunder. The Oedipal narrative is at once a .  
prohibition against regression to the maternal body, to a descent into undifferentiated nature, 
and an assertion of the struggle to acquire the autonomous ego of the father to internalize the 
paternal prohibition. However, since the ego "hows nothing" of the id, the latter remains 
"the perennial element of that which is not absorbed into identity." In the course of their 
discussions of myth, both Adorno and Horkheimer retreated from 'the Freudian concept of 
"the individual. The problem with Freud's Oedipal story, they claimed, is that it already 
assumes as a goal what it purports to explain whereas "the individual is only a theater." 
Since the outcome of the struggle presumes authentic selfhood, however, Horkheimer and 
Adorno regarded Freud's account as the "inadequate attempt to do justice to the historical 
transformations which the individual undergoes. "60 
Dialectic of Enlightenment also attributes to Totem and Taboo the conclusion that 
there are no parallels between totemic mimesis and the scientific description of nature. 
Freud, they claim, restricts the absolute identity of thought and reality to magic, ignoring the 
way that sovereignty reappears in the autonomy of ideas achieved by the rational ego. These 
remarks notwitstanding, Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the prohibition on mimesis 
closely parallels Freud's discussion in Totem and Taboo. In both texts conscience and 
$<- consciousness arise as the consequence of an orighary prohibition of images that occurs at 
--$ primordial juncture in human evolution, and both interpret the prohibition as the impetus for 
its transformation into abstract thought. As Gertrud K&h points out, Adorno did not simply 
consider the prohibition in terms of a historical moment of cultural anthropology, but 
conceived of aesthetics as a "particular variant of the Jewish prohibition on images." The 
prohibition leads, on the one side, to the liquidation of the image and the traces of animism 
in magical cult and ritual, but also on the other, to the autonomy of the artistic 
representati~n.~ 
At the core of Freud's intepretation of the orginal prohibition on uttering the name of 
the dead, is his claim that "totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt 
to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to Fear of the 
dead is the result of a hostile projection of evil impulses into demons that gives rise to 
'animism." In Freud's narrative this fear leads to the substitution ,of animal names for the 
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name of the dead, and extends through a series of displacements designed both to outwit the 
evil spirits, and to efface the hostile feelings. In the fully developed totemic system the 
prohibition on on the image of the father gives way to religion. The prohibition on 
representing the dead is thus "probably the earliest form of in which the phenomenon of 
conscience is met Freud also remarks on how the mimetic impulse takes the form 
of the "symptom" in hysteria, and how neurotic behavior parallels the growing process of 
abstraction from totem animal to God, and ultimately to scientific rationality: "It might be 
maintained that a case of hysteria is a caricature of a work of art, that of an obsessisional 
neurosis is a caricature of a religion, and that a parnoic delusion is a caricature of a 
philosophical ~ystem."~ Thus, the origins of consciousness is located at the intersection of 
two decisive processes: the prohibition of the image and its displacement into the abstract 
system, and the need to differentiate self from nature.' 
In their initial conversations Adorno and Horkheimer often equated Odysseus with 
Oedipus, perhaps following a passage in Bevond Good and Evil where Nietzsche anticipates 
dialectic of enlightenment: "hardened in the discipline of science, he [man] stands before the 
of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs 
of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, "you are more, 
you are higher, you are of a different origin."* The equation of Odysseus with Oedipus 
here concerns their respective blindness and deafness to nature, while for Adorno and 
Horkheimer, the capacity for speech, for its transcendence in music and images, also divides 
humanity from nature. In the Freudian account, the story of Oedipus presents the 
differentiation fiom mother and myth as tragedy. However, in Horkheimer and Adorno's, 
Oedipus's blindness to his fate cannot compare with the more powerful theme of the Homeric 
hero's successful evasion of the presymbolic and premythical world of identity through 
cunning and reason. In the course of their discussions the fundamental paradox of 
enlightenment emerges even more emphatically in relation to the conclusion of the Homeric 
epic: "Myth bears witness equally to the enslavement of humanity to nature, and to the 
possibility of escape. "'O Adorno also alludes to his book on Kierkegaard, where he wrote 
that in the act of annihilating nature, spirit becomes subordinate to nature by its act of 
mimesis, "originating in nature itself, hope is only able to truly overcome it by maintaining 
the trace of nature. "'I 
Mythical narratives for Adorno are the "replicas of prelinguistic experience in a world 
from which prelinguistic experience has already disappeared." His interest in the destructive 
potential of mimetic identification with nature was reinforced by his inordinate interestin a 
text which played an important if peripheral role in the discussions out of which Dialectic of 
Enlightenment - emerged, La mante religieuse. Recherche sur la nature et la significiation du 
mythe by the French anthropologist Roger Caillois. Caillois was a leading figure of the 
College de Sociologie (with which Benjamin was briefly d t e d ) ,  and Adorno reviewed 
the book for the Z e i t s c h r i f t f U r .  Caillois' focused on the residues of animal 
biology in the psychic life of the individual, 'exemplified by the Praying Mantis' devouring of 
her mate in the moment of copulalion as the natural historical source for a variety of similar 
motifs in myth and religion. Though Caillois posits a kind of pnmal biological "memory" in 
human behavior, Adorno was "positively stimulated" by it ("Es hat mich positiv beriihrt"), 
especially because of Caillois attention to the material elements in the construction of myth. 
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Above all, what drew Adorno to Caillois' text was his emphasis on the mimetic impulse in 
nature, an impulse that was all the more "strange" because the organism - in the mimetic act 
-- gives up the vital difference between life and matter, the organic and inorganic. Much as 
Adomo's philosophy regarded mimesis 'as a particular instance of the compulsion to identity 
that obliterates distinction, so in the animal kingdom mimiclay is the "fatal attraction" that 
annhilates itself in the act of desire. Adorno's analysis of anti-Semitism, as we shall see, 
adopts the same strategy, locating in modem Jew hatred the return of the archaic impulse to 
mimesis, which in its antipathy, imitates and therefore liquidates the Jew, all the more 
consequentially. 
Adorno was aware that Cdois'theory bore traces of "Freud's theory of the death 
drive, " "Jung's collective unconscious, " and "fashionable anthropology," and that it 
threatened to reduce all mythology to its biological substratum, thus making . 
incomprehensible "all human atkmpts to escape from the blind context of nature."R In a 
letter to Benjamin, he explained that the Eact that Caillois had not dissolved myths into some 
immanent theory of consciousness, or flattened them into the growing capacity for conscious 
symbols (a reference to Ernst Cassirer's account of myth which he and Horkheimer explicitly 
rejected in their discussions) resulted from the "materialism that he has in common with Jung 
and d y  with Klages," and with a 'cryptofascist belief in nature." 
As if to underscore the "mantis" as the emblem of fascist regression to 
undifferentiated and captivating feminine destructiveness, he adds that myths first emerge 
when a conflict comes into existence between the self identical human essence 
Wenschenwesen) and the husband eating woman."74 "As opposed to Caillois, Adorno sees 
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myth is an explanation for the fact that human beings were once animal, and now have 
become something else, while Caillois basically takes pleasure in the fact that they are still 
animals. "What we have to 'rescue' in the individual is the moment of thought or language," 
a concept of language that, as Horkheimer adds, is lost in any fundamental ontology of 
being, since "the moment of slyness or cunning disappears. "'' 
Dialectic of Enli~htenment initially arose from two distinct projects, a book on 
29, :  "dialectical logic" which Horkheimer planned to write as early as 1934 with the assistance of 
L - .  Marcuse and Karl Korsch, and the so-called "anti-Semitism project" which was initially - 
financed by the American Jewish Committee, and on which Horkheimer and other members 
, - of the Institute worked intensively during 1943. By then, however, it was already evident 
that 'Horkheimer and Adorno's efforts conformed to neither of these projects but would 
consist of a separate work, one in which, as Horkheirner noted, "the fragments contain the 
principles of philosophy to which we can stand and which is really original"76 At that time, 
several theses on the psychology of anti-Semitism, origmally destined to become part of the 
larger empirical research project on anti-Semitism, ended up as material to be included in the 
volumeof Thus it is understandable that in the first months of collaborative 
work on the Dialectic of Enlightenment anti-Semitism did not manifest itself as a central 
concern. Nor was it mentioned in the internal Institute memorandum" of 1942 which 
outlined the Institute's future projects in terms of a conventionally Marxian program of 
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political and economic analyses. "It appeared," Wiggershaus comments, as if Horkheimer 
and Adorno were still afraid of this theme, or they allowed it to perform its function as a 
"hidden center" of the book"78 NO doubt a decision to shift the focus of critical theory 
from the traditional Marxist questions of .monopoly capitalism or class conflict to the fate of 
the Jews would have produced dismay and skepticism among the Institute's more orthodox 
Marxist contributors. Franz Neumann, for example, wrote Adorno in 1940 that "I can 
imagine, and I have done this in my book, that one can represent National Socialism without 
attributing to the Jewish problem a central role."79 
Wiggershaus suggests that Benjamin's death played an important part in Adomo and 
Horkheimer's decision to seriously propose a joint book on anti-Semitism. Indeed only a 
. fe6 months later, Adorno wrote to Horkheimer: "It often seems to me, as if all that, which 
we were used to seeing in terms of the proletariat, has today shifted with terrible intensity to 
the Jews. I ask myself, though it is not completely consistent with the project, if the things, 
which we actually want to say should not be said in connection with the Jews, who represent 
the counterpoint to p o ~ e r . " ~  In the Fall of 1940, Horkheimer wrote "I am convinced on 
the basis of our joint convictions, that grant.or not, we will go forward on anti-Semiti~m."~' 
In September 1940 Adorno sent Horkheimer "a couple of - completely unformulated 
- thoughts on the theory of Anti-Semitism." However "provisional" these thoughts were, 
and however much "they might be in need of modification, we have arrived at a really 
important place," Adorno wrote, "namely, at a unified and non-rationalistic explanation for 
anti-Semiti~m."~~ Adomo begins with the inadequacy of al l  rational economic and social 
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explanations of anti-Semitism since anti-Semitism predates both liberalism and capitalism. 
The stubborn resistance of anti-Semitism to rational argument points towards the fact "that 
very old motifs that have long since become s a n d  nature" must be in play, motifs that have 
nothing to do either with the relationship between Jews and Christians, nor with the money 
economy, nor directly with enlightenment, although the last probably stands in a deep 
relation to those archaic motifs." Adorno's analysis is directed at the prehistory of the Jews, 
at their persistence in a nomadic existence long after the world consisted of permanent 
settlements. As "the secret gypsies of history," the Jews are a "prematriarchal" peoples 
whose lack of ties to the earth and to a fixed locale, always threatened to subvert the ideals 
-2:; of civilized life: home, family, labor. From the standpoint of other peoples "the image of the 
.-... Jew represented a stage of humanity which did not yet h o w  labor, and all later attacks on 
the parasitic, thieving character of the Jews were mere rati-~ns."~~ 
Here the Jews represent, not the imperative to civilization but the refusal to be 
"civilized" and submit to.the primacy of labor, whose collective remembrance of a "land of 
milk and honey" is the "Jewish utopia." The taboo on that image 'is simultaneously the taboo 
on the recalling of a nomadic existence and is, according to Adorno, "the origin of 
antisemitism." The expulsion of the Jews is the attempt, Adorno concludes, to reproduce 
the expulsion from Paradise, and, as such to imitate it. In a letter sent only a two weeks 
earlier Adorno alluded to the broader sigmficance of the theses for the conception of the 
Jews as representatives of the principle of non-identity in the modern world: "There are by 
the way the closest connecticnls between the theory of the Jews as "fools", and our 
conception of modern art on the one hand, and that of Jews as nomads, since the absence of 
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a settled existence, and the failure to bind to the reified character of an object of action stem 
from the same 
In October 1941, Adorno, anticipating his impending move to Los Angeles, hoped 
that the planned joint book on anti-Semitism would soon "crystallize" with the justification 
that "Anti-Semitism "signdies today really the focal point of injustice, and our sort of 
physiognomy must return to the world, where it shows its most terrible face,"86 In the 
Odysseus essay, which was finished one year later (1942), we find clues to the suspicion that 
the figure of Odysseus is not merely the primordial "subject", the bourgeois in m, but also 
the Hellenic prototype of Ahamas, the wandering Jew. In a letter to Pollock, Horkheimer 
explained that "the Odyssey is the first document on the anthropology of man in the modem 
sense, that means, in the sense of a rational enlightened being." But he also noted that the 
study "will also be of some value for the project [Anti-Semitism] "since the idea of ritual 
sacrifice which Odysseus tries to overcome will probably play a dominant role in the 
psychology of ~nti-Se~nitism."~~ Odysseus reveals "the fate that the language of the 
cunning man, the middleman brings down on himself." He is described in terms that suggest 
the stereotype of the Jewish tradesman: he is a rootless wanderer, a Greek Ahasverus 
physically weak, deceitful, and babbles incessantly. In his excessive attachment to speech, to 
language, Homer embodies in his hero, as does the eternal Jew, "the disaster that the 
enlightened word brings down on itself."(0/132) The "Semitic element" of the Odyssey is 
also suggested in a footnote which echoes the theme that Odysseus, "the feudal lord, bears 
the trace of the oriental merchant."(O/l25). If this is indeed the case, the figure of Odysseus 
is directly linked to the nomadic, premahiarchal character of the figure of the Jew outlined in 
Adorno's theory of anti-Semitism in 1940. 
By the middle of 1943, the chapter on the culture industry as well as the first, 
second, and third essays had been completed and work was focushg on what was still 
thought of in terms of the theoretical part of the Anti-Semitism project. It is apparent, 
however, that by then littie remained the central argument of Horkheimer's "The Jews and 
Europe," (1939) which interpreted the persecution of the Jews as a direct consequence of 
monopoly capitalism's systematic elimination of the "sphere of circulation," on which the 
Jews, as personifications .of market "rationality" were de~endent.'~ In 1941, Leo Liiwenthal 
joined Adomo in formulating what became the "elements of Antisemitism" and which 
k unequivocally announced that National Socialist anti-Semitism was "a tuming point in 
historyn (DW200). 
"Whereas there is no longer any need for economic domination," the first thesis 
maintains, the Jews are "marked out as the absolute object of domination pure and simple" 
(though, as a c o n d o n  to Marxism, the workers, are still considered "the ultimate target"). 
For the fascists the Jews are "an opposing race," "the embodiment of the negative principle" 
and as such, their extermhation is necessary "to secure the happiness of the 
world" @E/ 168). For Adorno and Horkheimer modem anti-Semitism is no longer a 
diversionary tactic, a "luxury for the masses," but rather a d & t a t i o n  of its deep roots in 
civilization which still remain obscure. 
The relationship between the 'reappearance of a false, mythologizing mimesis in 
fascism and the project of the extermination of the Jews is boldly stated at the beginning of 
the "Elements": "the portrait of the Jews that the nationalists offer to the world is in fact 
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their own self portrait."(DE/l68) Paradoxically, the anti-Semitic goal of ridding the world 
of the stigma of difference led to the Jewish desire to assimilate, just as the "barbaric 
collectivew singled them out as different. But such rational explanations ignore the fact that 
both "persecutor and victim belong to the same circle of eviln@E/171). Anti-Semitism is "a 
deeply imprinted schema, a ritual of civilization." 
Though the argument that commerce is the "fate of the Jews," is still mentioned, the 
"Elements of anti-Semitismn are in fact a series of interpretations of the "ritual" of anti- 
- Semitism, of the sacrifice of the Jews in which theological, psychological, and 
anthropological motifs are intertwined. All of these suggest a connection both to the 
Odysseus chapter and to Adorno's provisional 1940 theses: that the Jews are sacrificed as the 
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ultimate victims of the taboo on mimesis. The origins of the thesis that the prohibition - 
against making an image of God was the specific form of a more generalized renunciation of 
mimesis can of course, be attributed to Freud, who noted in Moses and Monotheism that "it 
meant that a sensory perception was given second place to what may be called an abstract 
idea."89 In modern civilization uncontrolled mimesis is expunged first in the religious 
prohibition idolatry, on images of god, subsequently in the general contempt for all image 
bound wanderers: nomads, actors, gypsies, and finally in rationalization. For Horkheimer 
and Adorno, anti-Semitism is explicitly identified with the proscription on mimesis: 
"Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic behavior proper, by 
organized contra-1 of mimesisn@E/180). The murder of the Jews is a form of revenge for 
civilization's triumph over nature; those who first turned ritual sacrifice into rationality by 
carr$ng out the prohibition are themselves sacrificed as the expression of "repressed 
mimesis."(l87) The secret gypsies of history "are abandoned by domination when its 
progressive alienation from nature makes it revert to mere nature. " @E/ 184) 
Insofar as the Jews represent, not only the carriers of the taboo on mimesis, but also 
those who have not entirely succumbed to its logic, they appear to "those blinded by 
civilization experience their own tabooed mimetic featuresn @E/ 18 1) The very torment that 
the Jews experience as a result of their lack of security and membership in the communtiy is 
a provocation, an image of the "powerless happinessn that is "unbearable because it would 
be true happiness." The image of the Jew as powerful, intellectual, wealthy, but also as 
suffering and powerless evokes the unfulfilled promise of civibtion, whose "image is then 
*L. 
used by domination to perpetuate itself"(DH1172). Jews represent, at once, power and 
1. 
abjection, property and impotence, which evokes fear and "attracts the enemy of 
impotence. " @EJ 169) 
Y 
The transgression against the prohibition on mimicry, imitation, and archaicism is 
'. 
endemic to fascism's sanctioning of the visual image over the written word, and more 
speafically evident in the anti-Semitic obsession with the physiognamic and corporal marks 
of Jewishness. The taboo is evoked first in nationalist hatred of the cosmopolitan ideals of 
Bildung and demystification, but also in a deep-seated religious hostility at the Jewish 
responsibility for Christianity's "interdiction on natural religion. " The fact that Christianity 
cannot sustain the taboo and is forced to resort to mimesis, first in the "spirtuahd idolatry" 
of Christ as spirit become flesh, and second, in the reversion to pagan and magical practices 
in the church (lighting a candle, cult of the saints), compensate for the unfulfilled promise of 
salvation, for which the Jews are also sacrificed. Horkheirner, in a lecture given at Temple 
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Israel in Los Angels in April 1943, quoted Freud's argument in Moses and Monotheism that 
Christian rage against the Jews derived not from the Jews themselves, but from a deeper core 
of pagan resentiment against Christianity: "they have not got over a grudge against the new 
religion which was imposed on them; but they have displaced the grudge on to the source 
from which Christianity reached them. "90 
The most archaic form of mimesis is evident in what they call the "idiosyncracy" of 
the anti-Semites, their fear of and obsession with the "alien" quality of certain gestures, or 
pychological techniques, like flattery, "passed own by a process of unconscious imitation." 
The Jew's own unique form of mimicry arouse gentile anger because, "in the face of the new 
conditions of production, it displays the old fear, which, ... must be forgotten."@E/182) 
Mimesis also reappears in the fascist refusal of a "homeland" to the Jews who are forced to 
imititate their nomadic past, and finally in the very physiognomy of torture, the terror of the . 
victims: in "the convulsive gestures of the martyred, we see the mimetic impulse which can 
never be completely despoyed."@/183) It is of no consequence whether the Jews actually 
have the features attributed to them: "when all the horror of prehistory which has been 
overlaid with civilhation is rehabilitated as rational interest by projection onto the Jews, 
there is no restriction. "DE1186 
The prohibition on mimesis brings all of its past history to bear on the persecution of 
the Jews: the ritual discipline, the uniforms, the marches, the "monotonous repetition of 
words and gestures are simply the organized imitation of magic practices. Even the nature 
that fascism claims to be is not authentic nature but a copy of its copy, a "mimesis of 
mimesis (DBl85). This fact explains the peculiar synthesis of rational and irrational 
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practice - the "rationalized idiosyncracyn - that fascism employs: the violence of speech, 
the gesticulating of the fascist leaders, the abrogation of law, the replication of mythical 
practices, and the rationality of destructive violence al l  partake in a "surrender to the mimetic 
attraction. "@E/183) 
The "Elements of anti-Semitism," it might be argued, ultimately holds the Jews 
accountable for their own fate. In contrast to the image of the Jews in the first chapter, 
where, in Freud's words they secure "a triumph of intellectuality over sensuality," the Jews 
appear here in a more ambivalent light, as those who impose the taboo on mimesis and as 
the carriers of a "premythological, " "prematriarchal, " residue of mimesis.g1 Adorno's 
thesis that anti-Semitism preserves the image of Jews as "nomadic" explicitly identifies them, 
not merely with the perpetration of the taboo, but with the refusal to adapt to it. Even 
assidation is a deception, for the Jews a selfdeception, for the anti-Semites, a magical 
ruse. The Jews appear here as they are sometimes portrayed in the Nazi racial ideal, in the 
personification of "Jiid Siiss," for example, who cleverly masks the gestures of the "Ostjude" 
and transmogrifies his physiognamy in order to "pass" as an enlightened man of Western 
culture. In the "Elements" this image is turned against the Nazis in the form of a paradox. 
Insofar as the Jews are at one level responsible for the rencunciation on mimiclay, they are, 
at the same time, evocative of the taboo, since, from the standpoint of the anti-Semites, even 
the desire to asslrmlate 
. . is mere imitation. Both the Jewish experience of modernity, and 
modernity's refusal of the Jew can be seen & mutually constitutive facts of their historical 
experience. What is never expressed in the "Elements" is the implicit connection between the 
banished and defamed Jews, and "degenerate" modernist art (which are considered identical 
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by the Nazis) which are both subject to execration and repugnance because of their "mimetic 
attraction. Both are condemned to be obliterated by the practitioners of the cult of false 
mimesis because they alone still bears traces of a dangerous "true mimesis," the shared 
refusal of complete absorption in the object as "picture", representation, and symbol.92 
It is difficult to find fault with the argument that Nietzsche holds pride of place in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Nietzsche, Adorno grants, "was one of the few since Hegel who 
recognu& the dialectic of enlightenment. 'He formulated its ambiguous relation to 
domination" (011 101) There is, however, little justification for Habermas's assertion that in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment .Hegel is also Nietuche's great antipodew and that 'Nietzsche 
radicalizes the counter-~nlightenment. "93 This judgement could hardly be further from 
Adorno's sympathetic evaluation of Nietzsche, whom he described in 1947 as "one of the 
most advanced enlighteners of all." Nietzsche, he claimed, "sensed in the 'system' and 
what it entailed the same apologetic desire he sensed in the religion of redemption or, for 
that matter, in the truly systematic totality of the Wagnerian Music drama. When he turned 
against the 'accepted values of civilization, love and pity, ultimately reaffbmed by Wagner, 
his motive was not complicity with the dawning relapse'into barbarism, but just the opposite; 
he realized the barbarian momentum inherent in official cultural values. "w This judgement 
aligns Adorno with Nietzsche, not merely as an enlightener who "recognized in 
enlightenment just as much the universal movement of sovereign spirit," but, more 
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importantly as the inspiration for his reflections on the guilt sacrifice in the Odysseus 
chapter. Ln a letter to Horkheimer he added that Nietzsche's "misconception" was only that 
he failed to see that the will to power was nothing more than the anxiety of losing power, of 
becoming 'caught in the compulsion of nature. Nietzsche's will to power became his 
ideology, 'insofar as he was not critical enough to recognize that what he regarded as a "pure 
drive" or instinct, was already undergoing rationalization. "Had Nietzsche really grasped the 
will to power as anxiety and entrapment in nature, and he often comes close enough, then his 
-philosophy would have coincided with the truth. "" Adorno's sparse commqts on the 
fascist appropriation of Nietzsche could be expanded on here, but it is clear that unlike 
Horkheimer, Adorno considered the "the liquidation of enlightenment" and the ideological 
glorification of naked force in the name of an archaic mythology, as entirely inconsistent - 
with Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche's "error" was not his failure to take the victim into 
account, as Horkheimer had once said, but rather his "Amor fati," his willingness to sanction 
as fate the "infinity of such sadceN(MM/98), which ultimately turns him into an 
accomplice of the rationality he otherwise despises. One can, without stretching the analogy 
too much, see an act of mimesis in the relationship between Dialectic of Enlightenment and 
On the Genealogv of Morals: without becoming its other, through similitude and 
appropriation, the genealogy of morals becomes the genealogy of domination. 
That Adomo, more than any other figure in the Frankfwt School's inner circle, was 
ataacted to Nietzsche is also evident from the revealing transcript of a lecture and discussion 
by Ludwig Marcuse, the biographer and historian, held in Los Angela on July 14 1942. 
Though Marcuse's lecture is not preserved apart from a brief summary, it focused on three 
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distinct concepts of culture in Nietzsche: the cult of the genius artist; the anti-aestheticism of 
the "free spirit", the breaker of idols; and the ijbermensch as the distillation of a l l  historical 
utopias. Marcuse's conclusion, which amounted to a defense of Nietzsche's "radical work of 
destruction" and his transcendence of the material through "desire", provoked a strong 
reaction by most. of the Institute members present, most prominently Herbert Marcuse (no 
relation) who questioned whether the iibermensch could ever be equated with "utopia." 
Marcuse refused to consider Horkheimer's cautious proposition that with the abolition of 
materid human want, our thinking, as well as Nietzsche's "will appear radically 
differentngd "If Marx is right, then Nietzsche is wrong," Marcuse replied. By contrast, 
Adorno saw advantages in Nietzsche's thinking that did not merely supplement, but went 
beyond the insights of Marxism: "Despite its categories, Nietzsche's cultural criticism 
revealed certain aspects of the social problematic, which are not immediately evident 
through the Critique of Political Economy. We have to decode Nietzsche and to what 
sort of weighty experience lies behind it. I believe, that one then arrives at things, which are 
not so distant from the interests of most human beings." Adorno saw in Nietzsche's phrase, 
"no shepherd but a herd" the intimation that domination can survive the eclipse of direct 
forms of control, that control can "migrate into human beings themselves." * 
In this circle Adorno could only hint at his debt to On the Genealoev of Morals, and 
specifically to those passages where Niebsche elaborated on the principle of exchange 
embodied in sacrifice as the "prehistory" of man.98 Indeed, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
"the history of civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrillce," as it is expressed in 
Nietzsche as "guilt indebtedness."@E/90). Both Manr and Nietzsche understood history as 
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sacrifice incurred through exchange: where Marx sees the price of labor's transformation of 
nature as self-alienation and abstraction, Nietzsche sees originary exchange as a 
spiritualization of cruelty, i n t e e t i o n  of instinct, religious selfdenial, and the asceticism 
of modem science.99 
The sources of Dialectic of Enlightenment's Nietzscheanism are not only to be found 
in ~ietzsche's moral philosophy but also in his version of the taboo on mimesis in The Birth 
of Tragedv, where "theoretical man" substitutes for Dionysian "wisdom and art," as well as 
for myth, "a metaphysical comfort and earthly consonance, in fact a deus ex machina of its 
own, the god of machines and crucibles, that is the powers of the forces of nature, 
recognized and employed in the service of a higher egoism."100 And finally, "the 
enlightener" of the Odysseus chapter is often undermined by Horkheirner's far more 
disparaging treatment of Nietzsche in the "Juliette" chapter where he goes so far as to 
suggest that critical theory ultimately prefers "the formalism of reason" to Nietzsche's 
remytholgization of power and his preference for the "predators" over the weak (DEJ99). 
Though Horkheimer begins by considering "the will to power" as the final incamation of 
Kantian morality, the "abrogation of the law through self-legislation," the chapter concludes 
by upholding Kant against Niebsche. "The fact that Sade and Nietzsche insist on the 
more decisively even than logical positivism implicitly liberates from its hiding-place the 
utopia contained in the Kantian notion of reason, as in every great philosophy: the utopia of 
a humanity which, itself no longer distorted, has no further need to distort."@E/119) 
Here there is little trace of Nietzsche the "enlightener," but rather the Sadean figure 
that appears as an anti-Kant who "maliciously celebrates the powerful and their cruelty." 
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Classes, races, and nations, which dominate, and those that are dominated are a€l that 
remain of enlightened reason denigrated to mere self-preservation, to the point where "theory 
itself becomes an incomprehensible conceptW@E/93). In this, the weakest chapter of 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, there is no hint of the arguments about sacrifice, cunning, and 
mimesis that redeem enlightenment in its moment of self-preservation. If enlightenment can 
be rescued from these "dark" but "true" thinkers, Horkheimer implies, it is only by the 
vaguest assertions about "the Law, " the "ten commandments, " spiritual love, " and other 
pieties. "Hope," wrote Horkheimer, in "The End of Reason," "has been overshadowed by 
the consciousness of universal' doom. "lo' Habermas notwithstanding, there is very little 
dialectic in this enlightenment. Though Horkheimer sees Nietzsche's thought as a symptom 
of the radicalization of the autonomy of Reason that reduces the power of nature "to mere 
indiscriminate resistance to the abstract power of the subject,"@E/90), one can also regard 
the mimetic substitution of sacrifice in both morality and in N~etzsche's aesthetics as 
constitutive of a subjectivity capable of resisting mythologization. 
The humor of the Frankfurt School is underservedly ignored. Consider, for example, 
the perhaps not so tongue-in-cheek 1944 memorandum from Adorno to Horkheimer, 
suggesting that since "not aU the recurring objections against the Jews are of an entirely 
spurious, projective, paranoid character," that a "manual for distribution among Jews" be 
prepared which lists these objectionable traits and "contains suggestions how to overcome 
them," for example, "the disproportionate concern with one's own bodily comfort or with 
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health."lo2 Adorno further remarked that the "manual" should "appeal to the inexhaustible 
source of Jewish self-criticism, irony, and encourage Jews to draw the consequences out of 
the critical insight into their own deficiencies instead of simply laughing at them." Among 
the jokes suggested is this one: if a gentile is thirsty he drinks a glass of water, whereas the 
Jew sees a Doctor and gets a test for diabetes."1a) Dr. Adorno received from Horkheimer a 
respond suggesting that he take this idea up with the "section on business ethics of the Anti- 
Defamation League in Chicago."'@' Did Adorno slip from a description of the paranoid 
projection of the anti-Semite, of the Jew as the physical embodiment of the tabooed gestures 
and repressed emotions to the belief that it is the Jews themselves that unconsciously provoke 
the anti-Semititic reaction? ' This ironic text, which should perhaps be taken just so seriously 
echoes the ambivalence towards the Jews that is expressed in the "Elements of Anti- 
Semitism." Just as the Jews themselves participate unconsciously in eliciting the "etic 
attraction" of the anti-Semites, so too American Jews must be warned against evoking anti- 
Semitism through their unconscious behavior. 
In the concluding pages of the Odysseus essay Adorno proposes yet another reading 
of the mimetic element in enlightenment, one which emphasizes the element of wit in the act 
. of substitution. If the Gods are appeased with human objects and animal sacrifices, their 
stupidity in the face of the ruse is the object of Homeric laughter. Laughter outwits not 
merely external nature, but confounds the gods, and makes escape possible: "Laughter is 
bound to the guilt of subjectivity, but in the suspension of law, which it announces, it also 
points beyond entrapment. It promises the way home."(O/ 139) This sentence also helps 
explain why Adorno, who wrote with such seriousness, could also be at times, as his 
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contemporaries knew, so silly (Albern).lM He composed parodies of Hasidic folktales 2 la 
Martin Buber, and collected clippings of "Nancy," "Steve Canyon," and other comics of the 
day. Anyone who reads the correspondence between Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 
is immediately struck by the humorous "pet names" with which they frequently addressed 
each other. Horkheimer was the wooly "mammoth," Adorno, "Archibald" and 
"Hippopotamus" (Niipferd), Gretel Adorno "Giraffe" and "Gazelle", and so on. Awaiting 
word on his decision to emigrate to California, Adorno reminded Horkheimer, that "for a 
'hippopotamus the most important thing is peace and quiet. "lo' These "cute" terms of 
endeaiment are so unnexving, perhaps because they are partake of the animism which lives 
on, not least in the culture industry, whose most prominent stars are animals with human 
speech and countenances. Such figures belong to the mythology of childhood, and their 
continued use by the philosophers of the Frankfurt School attests to the intimacy of 
relationships that had begun in adolescence and early adulthood. But under the conditions of 
exile, their persistence can also be seen in a more biblical light. The Institute was 
Horkheimer's Ark and Adorno's Odysseus essay, which pays homage to another heroic 
voyager, offers a more profound theological interpretation of these nicknames as the echo of 
a primordial laughter that is "the imrption of blind and obdurate nature," as Adorno writes. 
Such names also represent the opposite, a triumph over natural force: "in laughter blind 
nature gives up its destructive force. This duality of laughter is close to that of the name and 
perhaps names are nothing but frozen laughter, as is still evident today in nicknames, the 
only names in which something of the original act of naming surYives"(O/l39). As 
Benjamin showed in his famous 1916 essay "On Language as Such and the Language of 
Man," the naming of the animals occurred before language "fell into the abyss of the 
mediateness of all  communication. "lo' Nicknames thus contain a weak totemic power 
insofar as they evoke the memory of solidarity with nature before it had become mute. 
For the theorists of the Frankhnt School the catastrophe of the Jews was inextricably 
bound up with the prohibition on mimesis and its return in the form of anti-Semitism and 
politicized mimickry. The loss of the capacity to imitate nature, and' the taboo on "reverting 
to mimetic modes of existence," was the price of civilization. But if the "pitiless prohibition 
of regression becomes inere fate," the tabooed mimesis was preserved in the fear of the 
victims. The persistence of mimesis, in art, or in the nicknames or jokes that parry tenor 
'.. ... . ;. 
retain the remembrance of the nahlre that is obliterated by the taboo.Ia As Odysseus 
-'. 
replaced Oedipus because his wit permitted him to evade the fate to which Oedipus blindly 
summbed, Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of ~nli~htenment was an effort to 
... ., 
philosophically outwit myth, and to create "the possibility of escape" through enlightenment 
sensitized to the power of mimesis. 
X. 
In December 1946, in a lecture to the American Philosophical Association meeting in 
Eugene Oregon, Horkheimer defended his critical theory against the criticism that the "since 
neither the revival of the old, nor the discovery of new mythologies can bring the process of 
Enlightenment to a halt, they had been pressed into a pessimistic attitude, a condition of 
despair and nihilism." Far 'from falling into "romantic wish-dreams", as so many critics of 
Enlightenment had done, he concluded, "the hope of reason lies in emancipation from its 
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own fear of despair. "Io9. Only a few months earlier, Horkheimer elaborated on this idea to 
Adorno, proposing that they collaborate on a sequel to Dialectic of Enlightenment which 
Horkheirner suggested calling "Rescuing Enlightenment" (Rettung der Aufklhng) In 
contrast, to existentialism which hyposWized the moment of existence, Horkheimer 
suggested, a "solution to our opposition in relation to Schopenhauer." Our theme, he 
continued, is "to positively embrace truth in the determination of meaninglesness, and by this 
measure, to save thought. "'lo Here it is not any "inationalism" on Adorno's part, nor the 
"Nietzscheanism" of critical theory which divided the authors. Rather Adorno's antipathy 
was directed at Horkheimer's positive Schopenhauerian embrace of the senselessness of the 
world and thereby to refuse any reconciliation with it. From Adorno's perspective 
Horkheimer's solution, to turn "senselessness into sense," brought him into close proximity 
to Heidegger, for whom the "transcendence of being tealizes itself thorough the 
consciousness of its nothingness." Schopenhauer, Adorno responded, was in fact, the 
"ancestor" of existentialism."' 
For Adomo, Horkheimer's insistence on the "consciousness of negativity," seemed 
anchored in the philosophy of totality: "If for you I am a positivist, you are an idealist" he 
wrote. "Bad Enlightenment dispenses with the concept of difference through absolute 
totality, the correct one, holds on to the concept of difference (Differem) against its 
flattening."l12 It is perhaps less important here that Adorno once again reiterated his 
critique of all philosophical reconciliation and his insistence on the "experience of 
difference," than the more important fact that these exchanges bear witness to Horkheimer 
and Adorno's inability to work through the consequences of their critique of reason. When 
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Horkheimer, suggested, just a few days later, that their difficulties with the dialectic were in 
large part analogous to the conundrum of simultaneously criticizing Soviet tyranny and 
(American) democracy, and that critical theory was in danger of becoming a modern 
equivalent of ancient stoicism, Adorno agreed only that the "congealment of power, is as 
difficult today as was then." "As theoreticians of reason," Adorno remarked, "we cannot 
simply leap with one jump into the categories of politics and society."113 Evoking 
Benjamin in Minima Moralia, Adorno, expressed his notion of theory as addressing itself to 
the things which were not embraced by the dynamic of victory and defeat, "which feel by the 
wayside - what might be called the waste products and bind spots that have escaped the 
dialectic. His sense of what might still be salvaged from Enlightenment is expressed not in 
terms of a "political" or. "philosophical" solution, but in terms that remain loyal to the 
fundamental posture of the Odysseus chapter, critique is possible as a ruse of reason: 
"Theory must needs deal with cross-grained, opaque, umshilated material, which as such 
admittedly has from the start an anachronistic quality, but is not wholly obsolete since it has 
outwitted the historical dynamic. "'l4 
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